Fighting poverty and child malnutrition: on the design of foreign aid policies by Chrysovalantis VASILAKIS
Fighting poverty and child malnutrition:
on the design of foreign aid policies
C. Vasilakis
Discussion Paper 2011-30Fighting poverty and child malnutrition:
on the design of foreign aid policies   .
Chrysovalantis Vasilakis†
Abstract
In this paper, we have developed a two-period overlapping-generation model fea-
turing the e ects of child nutrition in developing countries. The model gives rise to
multiple equilibria including a poverty trap. It shows that child nutrition status may
a ect the development of human capital unfavorably and leads countries into poverty.
Various exogenous foreign aid policies implemented by international organizations such
as the World Food Programme (WFP) are considered. School feeding programs can
solve social problems like child labor. However, they do not necessarily help countries
to achieve economic development. On the contrary they can lead to poverty if the
initial human capital is low. Only if the subsidies are large, can they prevent a country
being trapped in poverty. If the WFP provides a ﬁxed amount of food to households,
then a quality/quantity trade-o  takes place: Parents decrease the nutrition of their
o spring and increase the number of children they have. Consequently, total nutrition
decreases and the developing country gets locked into poverty whatever its level of hu-
man capital. At the end of the paper, we estimate the changes in human capital from
a sample of 66 developing countries (almost half of which are African countries), and
use the estimates to explore the quantitative e ects of the model. The model is then
calibrated under di erent production functions. The results conﬁrm the theoretical
predictions.
JEL classiﬁcation: I10; O11; O40; I11.
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11 Introduction
Malnutrition constitutes a global "silent emergency", killing millions every year and sapping
the long-term economic vitality of nations, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
In the state of the World’s Children 1998, UNICEF advised governments and other interna-
tional organizations to take measures against hunger and the violation of children’s rights.
The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that there are about 925 million undernour-
ished people in the world today. Hunger and malnutrition are a greater risk to worldwide
health than AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis combined. Consequently, hunger and malnu-
trition are top global priorities.
About 90 million people per year get food from the WFP, the largest humanitarian
organization worldwide. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), WFP
delivered almost 50% of global food aid in 2004. WFP’s mission is to improve the nutrition
and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives and to ﬁght
micronutrient deﬁciencies, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat
disease, including HIV and AIDS. For instance, in 2009, WFP spent 6.7 million dollars
supporting regions such as Uganda, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea,
o ering school feeding programs, subsidizing nutrition prices, providing ﬁnancial support to
local farmers and providing food to households.
This paper explores the causal links between nutrition, education and human capital
accumulation. It evaluates the e ciency of di erent WFP food aid programs aimed at im-
proving child nutrition and pushing the developing countries away from deprivation. Several
studies such as Arcand (2001), Wang et al. (2003) and more recently Curais et al. (2010)
show that nutrition a ects the health and economic development of nations. In particular,
these researchers argue that poor nutrition leads developing countries to impoverishment.
However they do not show how these countries can escape from the poverty trap. Galor and
Mayers (2003) show that the link between health and education contributes to explaining
the long term e ects of nutrition and health on economic growth. They show that if policies
ﬁnancing education are implemented without addressing deﬁciencies in nutrition, poverty
traps may persist.
In our benchmark model, we consider an overlapping generations model where agents live
for two periods. Agents get their utility from consumption and the human capital of their
surviving children. They choose how many children to have, their amount of schooling and
their level of nutrition. It is assumed that parents decide how their children allocate their
time between schooling and labor. Child labor, in fact may be crucial to their nutrition,
since many children in developing countries are forced to work to provide a supplement to
their parents income (see, for example, Hazan and Berugo, 2000; Adbus and Rangazas, 2010;
Curais et al., 2010 and Moav, 2005).
In our model, if children spend less time in education and more in work, the human capital
accumulation of children will have a negative impact on future human capital and thus on
the income of the country. In this framework, we assume that there is no bargaining between
parents and children regarding the allocation of the family’s income (see for instance Udry,
2003). Moreover, a key ingredient of our setting is that the children’s survival probability
depends on their nutrition status (see Strulik and Weisdorf, 2010; Gloom and Palumo,
1999). This allows us to investigate the e ects of health on human capital through changes
in mortality (see Chakraborty and Das, 2005) not only in the benchmark model but also in
the extension model where we include aid in the survival probability of children (see Hu 
and Jimenez, 2003).
Our model emphasizes the importance of the relationship between health and learning
2capacity (Curais et al., 2010). Here, nutrition has dynamic and synergistic e ects on eco-
nomic growth, through the channel of education. For instance, Neumann, et al. (2007) used
a randomized school feeding study that was conducted in the rural Embu District of Kenya
to test for a causal link between animal-source food intake and changes in micronutrients,
growth, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes. They showed that meat supplementation im-
proves growth, cognitive and behavioral outcomes in children. Simeon (1998) showed that
providing school meals can be beneﬁcial for learning because it relieves immediate short-
term hunger. Children who are not hungry are more attentive and have higher cognitive
abilities.
To capture this complementarity, we assume that the determinants of human capital
includes education, parental human capital (see de la Croix and Doepke, 2003) and the
nutrition status of the children (see Curais et al., 2010). Our benchmark model gives rise to
multiple equilibria (development regimes) and initial conditions matter. Some countries may
be caught in a poverty trap. Possible strategies (such as foreign food aid) will be identiﬁed
and evaluated to see if they allow developing countries to escape from poverty.
Recently a number of studies have focused on the relationship between foreign aid and
economic growth. Empirical studies, such as Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Economides et al.
(2008), have found that aggregate foreign aid has, on average, a positive e ect on growth
in a country. However, they have not focused on speciﬁc policies such as food assistance.
Other studies (see, for instance, Easterly et al., 2004; Roodman, 2007) have argued that
the recipient country’s characteristics determine the success or failure of foreign aid. Of
these, the most substantial are the timing of the distribution of aid during a negative trade
shock (Collier and Dehn, 2001) and the geographic/tropical location of the recipient nation
(Daalgard et al., 2004).
Our paper is closely related to those by Azarnert (2008) and Neanidis (2010). Azarnert
explored the inﬂuence of humanitarian aid on population growth and human capital ac-
cumulation. In his model, fertility decisions are based on a quantity/quality trade-o  for
children, as originally proposed by Becker (1960). This trade-o  arises because parents’
utility depends on both the number and the quality of their children. Azarnert (2008) shows
that aid increases fertility by reducing the cost of having more children. As a result, parents
invest less in the education of their o spring, which leads to a fall in human capital. However
Azarnert ignores the potentially beneﬁcial impact of foreign aid on the survival probability
of children, which has been extensively documented (see Hu  and Jimenez, 2003; Neanidis,
2010). His contribution also neglects the e ect of aid on nutrition and thus on children’s
health (see Kraak et al 1999).
Unlike Azarnert (2008), Neanidis (2010) examines the inﬂuence of foreign aid on pop-
ulation growth and health capital using a two period OLG model. He assumes that aid
is allocated to every child and adult. His model accounts for the endogeneity of parents’
allocation of time to childrearing, and in this way allows the impact of their decisions to be
internalized. He ﬁnds that aid per child (ﬂows of medication) increases the children’s survival
probability, thereby reducing fertility, while also contributing positively to children’s health
status. On the other hand, aid per adult increases fertility by reducing the quantity cost of
children, thereby reducing the time that parents spend in rearing their children. However
Neanidis neglects the fact that the survival probability of children should also depend on
health expenditure by parents (see Boucekkine and La argue, 2010; Chakraborty and Das,
2005); he assumes that it depends only on foreign aid. He also ignores the complementar-
ity that exists between health, education and human capital accumulation (see Galor and
Mayers, 2003; Curais et al., 2010). This complementarity is crucial because there are for-
eign aid programs (such as school feeding programs) whose goal is not only to increase the
3nutrition status of children, but also to encourage them to stay at school, and to diminish
the prevalence of child labor.
In contrast to these studies, the quantity/quality trade-o  in our framework depends on
fertility and on parental expenditure on the nutrition of their children, as well as on the
length of time that parents allow their children to spend at school. Moreover, we evaluate
the e ect of foreign food aid at di erent levels of initial human capital. Accounting for these
considerations in the model allows complex e ects of foreign food aid to be analyzed.
The model is extended by implementing four di erent foreign aid policies (mainly pro-
vided by the WFP). Total nutrition is constituted by foreign aid and the nutrition available
from parents. The WFP provides school meals or ﬁxed amounts of food in households, subsi-
dizes prices and improves the infrastructure of local food industries in developing countries.
The main results are that providing school meals and ﬁxed amounts of nutrition to house-
holds locks poor developing countries into poverty. In particular, these foreign aid programs
increase fertility by reducing the quantity cost of children. As a result parents invest less in
the nutrition of their children, leading to a slowdown in human capital accumulation which
may trap the recipient country into poverty. However, if the WFP decides to provide large
amounts of food in schools or in households, then child nutrition depends only on foreign
aid programs and the developing country can escape from the poverty trap: when the WFP
subsidizes the price of nutrition for children there is an income e ect, and parents can a ord
to o er more nutrition. The total nutrition therefore rises, thereby increasing the survival
probability of children and their human capital. As a result, poor countries can escape from
the poverty trap.
School feeding programs are more e cient for middle-income developing countries than
the other two foreign aid programs. School feeding programs increase the length of schooling
and improve the human capital of future generations even if the total nutrition remains
unchanged (Jacoby et al., 1996; Powell et al., 1983; Murphy et al., 2003 and Agarwai et
al., 1989). Child labor decreases, and so middle-income countries can achieve economic
development.
Finally, we consider the case when the WFP improves the infrastructure of local food
industries or supports local farmers ﬁnancially, so as to increase the quality of food and
to improve agricultural productivity. This improvement is captured in my framework by
the e ect of the technological level on human capital. An increase in the technological
level raises the human capital of future generations, and hence poor countries can achieve
economic development.
The model is calibrated at the end of this paper. Following the technique developed
by Bils and Klenow (2000), we obtain the human capital stock by using United Nations
surveys (UNESCO, 1977; 1983). Also, using data from Barro and Lee’s(1993) data base,
the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization, the parameters of human
capital accumulation can be estimated for 66 developing countries (almost half of them
in Africa). All the variables that feature as determinants of changes in human capital
(nutrition, education and parental human capital) are signiﬁcant. Other parameters are
based on existing research.
A numerical example of our model is presented for the following reasons. First, we know
that the majority of developing countries are rural economies. A linear production function
is used in the model so that analytical results can be obtained. In the calibration part, the
linear production function (as in the theoretical part) and the decreasing-returns-to-scale
production function that characterizes rural economies are investigated. The results are
same in both the theoretical and the numerical analysis. The numerical example is also
intended to investigate what level of assistance from the WFP is needed to lift countries
4out of poverty for each foreign aid policy. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of the parameters is
provided to ensure the validity of our results.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model,
Section 3 illustrates the dynamics of human capital, Section 4 presents the di erent foreign
aid programs incorporated in the benchmark model, Section 5 illustrates a computational
experiment and Section 6 presents the conclusions of this study.
2 The Benchmark Model
Fertility, mortality and net reproduction. Consider an OLG economy in which ac-
tivity extends over an inﬁnite horizon. In each generation, individuals live for two periods:
childhood and adulthood. All the decisions are taken by adults. Let Lt denote the number
of adults in period t, and nt the number of births per adult. The probability of survival
from childhood to adulthood is denoted by  t   [0,1]. In particular, it is synonymous with
the fraction of children, born in period t who become adults in period t+1. We assume that
the children live throughout the period t. At the end of the period t, the children either die
or become adults in period t +1 . It follows that the net reproduction rate is  tnt. Thus,
the adult population at period t +1is:
Lt+1 =  tntLt. (1)
We also assume that the survival probability is endogenous and a function of the to-
tal level of nutrition. In particular, we assume that  t =  (Mt), where  
 
(Mt) > 0 and
 
  
(Mt) < 0. This is similar to Fogel’s (1994) contribution, which showed that better nutri-
tion in childhood a ects health and life span during the adult years of life. Moreover, it is
consistent with Gloom and Palumo (1993) who analyzed a life cycle model where the sur-
vival probability was determined by health capital accumulated via nutritional investment.
The survival probability of children is expressed by the function:
 t = min[M 
t ,1]. (2)
with 0 <   < 1.
The speciﬁcation of survival probability is similar to that of Chakraborty and Das (2005)
and Boucekkine and La argue (2010):
Preferences and optimization. Adults maximize the utility which they derive
from their consumption ct, the number of children nt, and the human capital ht+1 of their
children, and the children’s survival probability  t. The utility function is given by:
lnct +   ln( tntht+1). (3)
5The parameter  > 0 is the altruism factor. Notice that the parents care about the quantity
nt t and quality ht+1 of their surviving children. This type of preference speciﬁcation has
been used in the literature on fertility and growth (see for instance, Galor and Weil, 2000;
Hazan and Berdugo, 2002; Moav, 2005).
The adults are endowed with one unit of time. Raising one child takes the fraction
    (0,1) of an adult’s time. The income of an adult is wtht where wt is the wage per unit
of human capital and ht is an adult’s human capital. Consequently, as is standard in the
literature (see for instance Barro and Becker, 1989; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Azarnet,
2008) the existence of the opportunity cost wtht nt creates a trade-o  between the quality
and the quantity of children. Furthermore, an adult has to choose a consumption proﬁle ct,
the number of children nt, the level of nutrition of the children mt, and the number of years
of schooling per child et.
Here, we measure the length of schooling, et as the number of post-primary years of
schooling (as primary school is usually compulsory). Hence, q represents the minimum
education received in primary school in developing countries. This parameter ensures that
human capital is positive. This reasoning has been extensively used by other researchers(see
de la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Hazan and Berdugo, 2002). However, Curais et al. (2010)
measures q from infancy in their human capital accumulation model.
The human capital of children ht+1 thus depends on their level of education et and total
nutrition Mt. In the benchmark model total nutrition equals with the nutrition o ered by
parents, mt. The human capital accumulation is:
ht+1 = BM
 1
t (et + q) 2h
1  1  2
t . (4)
We assume that the changes in human capital depend on the human capital of the
parents ht, and B which is the productivity of human capital (technological level). This
law motion of human capital is di erent from that used by Curais et al.(2010) since we
include the human capital of parents and the productivity of human capital. Furthermore,
B is taken as constant. More precisely, we assume that it is equal to one and it can be
inﬂuenced exogenously. ht captures the intergenerational transmission of human capital
within a family. In other words young individuals inherit some of the human capital of their
parents. This reﬂects cultural transmission within the family. Our model of human capital
accumulation di ers from that of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) since it contains nutrition
and we take q to be primary education.
Children can also contribute to family income. Children have an endowment of 1 unit
of time. This time is spent either learning et or working (1   et   q). The earnings of a
working child are wt (1   et   q). The child worker lacks experience and physical strength
compared to adult worker. Thus, we assume that 0 <   < 1.
Moreover, since we have homogenous agents in each sector of the model, we assume
that all children have the same productivity and their human capital does not inﬂuence it.
Furthermore, the parents spend all the household revenue on their own consumption and
the nutrition of their children. Thus, the budget constraint has the form:
ct + mtnt = wtht(1    nt)+wt (1   et   q)nt. (5)
6Firms. Firms produce using a constant-returns-to-scale technology:
Yt = Ht, (6)
where Ht is the total amount of human capital in the workforce. This assumption allows
analytical results to be obtained, although we know that constant returns to scale are not
realistic in rural economies. The same assumption was made by Adbus and Rangazas (2010),
who investigated the e ects of food consumption on economic growth in England during the
mid-18th century. The main reason that linear production functions are used is for simplicity
and to obtain analytical results 1. At the labor-market equilibrium, we have:
Ht = [1    nt]ht +  [1   et   q]nt. (7)
The workforce participation of parents consists of their remaining time after childbearing
and educating their children. It is therefore equivalent to the time for which a child works.
As the labor market is competitive, the child’s wage equals the child’s marginal productivity
at each date t, which is constant and normalized to wt =1for simplicity.
At this point in the analysis, I will impose two assumptions. Assumption 1 ensures the
positivity of human capital in the steady state. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) and Curais et
al. (2010) apply a similar condition. 2
Assumption 1. h0 >
 
 .
The second assumption ensures the positivity of the optimal choices.
Assumption 2. 1    1    2    > 0.
Optimal choices. Maximizing Equation 3 subject to Equations 4 and 5 yields the
optimal solutions for education, nutrition and fertility. These are:
et =
 
         
         
0 ht   h1,
 2[ht   ]
 (1  1  2  )   qh 1 <h t <h 2,
1   qh t   h2.
(8)
1In my numerical example I also present a decreasing returns-to-scale production function, Y = H 
t ,
that is consistent with agricultural economies
2They assume that the income generated by children is accrued to parents and the time taken to rear a
child is intensive. As a result the increasing di erential wage(between parental and child labor) leads to a
decrease in child labor when the initial human capital is large enough.
7The threshold levels of adult human capital3 h1 =
(q(1  1  2  )+ 2) 
 2  and h2 =
 (1  1  )
  2
deﬁne three distinct situations. In the low regime (developing countries), children only
attend primary school, and the rest of their childhood is dedicated to increasing the family
income. The time spent in education is positive and increasing with parents’ income when
human capital increases. In the high regime (developed countries), children spend all their
time in education. In other words, there is no child labor in the high regime.
The nutrition level o ered by constitutes the total nutrition that children receive:
mt = Mt =
 
           
           
( + 1)(ht   (1 q)
1    1 ht   h1,
( + 1)(ht   )
1    1  2 h1 <h t <h 2,
( + 1)(ht )
1    1 ht   h2.
(9)
The optimal level of nutrition given by this equation is the same as that given by with
Arcand (2001) and Wang et al. (2003). As already mentioned, these studies show that low
income level is related to low nutrition levels (see Appendix A and Figure 1). Hence, the
optimal nutrition choice is an increasing function of human capital. They used information
on GDP and average daily per capita calorie intake in 114 countries, and showed that
countries with higher GDP have higher levels of nutrition. When the maximum level of
nutrition is reached the number of children per adult decreases4.
nt =
 
           
           
(1    1)ht 
(1+ )(ht   (1 q)) ht   h1,
 ht(1  1  2  )
(1+ )(ht   ) h1 <h t <h 2,
(1    1) 
(1+ )  ht   h2.
(10)
3Which can also be considered as income because they involved a linear production function.
4Appendix A contains an analysis of nutrition at di erent levels of human capital. The optimal fertility
as ht increases is also investigated. This shows that nutrition increases and fertility decreases as human
capital rises. This e ect can be seen in Figure 1.
8Figure 1: Nutrition and Fertility in Benchmark model
Fertility is positive and decreasing with parental human capital (see Appendix A and
Figure 1). This mechanism dates to Becker (1960), where fertility decisions are based on a
quantity/quality trade-o  for children. This trade-o  arises because the utility of parents
depends on both the number of their surviving children and their quality (as captured
by their level of human capital). Human capital accumulation arises through investments
in education and nutrition, both of which are costly, hence the trade-o . Thus, as human
capital increases through nutrition and education, fertility decreases. In other words, parents
choose child quality over child quantity. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that
shows that the fertility rate is lower in developed countries (for instance see Galor and Weil,
2000; Chakraborty, 2004; Azarnet, 2006; Moav, 2005) and it tends towards a constant value.
3 Evolution of human capital
Using the optimal decisions on education, total nutrition and fertility, the following picture
for human capital accumulation is obtained:
ht+1 =
 
             
             
( + 1)
 1(ht   (1 q))
 1h
1  1  2
t q
 2
(1  1  ) 1 ht   h1,
( + 1)
 1(ht   )
 1+ 2h








1  1  2
t
(1  1  ) 1 ht   h2.
(11)
Further assumptions are needed to ensure that children receive a minimum human capital
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 1+ 2 )(1    1    2    )
and qmin >> 0.
This assumption deﬁnes a lower and an upper boundary for q. Figure 2 shows the
existence of three steady states, one for each regime. Depending on the parameter values,
the highest steady state could be above or below h2
5.
Figure 2: Human capital
5The three steady states are presented in the Appendix
10When the level of human capital is below h2, the economy converges to an equilibrium
with low nutrition, high fertility and low human capital hss1, which is locally stable (see
Figure 2). This steady state is a poverty trap because it is an asymptotic destination of any
economy whose initial human capital stock is in the interval (
 
 , hss2). A poverty trap can
be deﬁned as "any self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist" (Azariadis
and Stachurski, 2005).
However there are two additional steady states, one unstable and one stable. As a result,
the economy either falls into poverty or achieves economic development.
Proposition 1.
1. Under Assumptions 1 to 4 and hss3 <h 2, a single locally steady state, hss1 and an
unstable steady state, hss2 exist. Hence, if the country’s initial human capital stock
lies in the interval (
 
 , hss2) the economy will fall into a poverty trap.
2. If hss3 >h 2 and hss2   [h1,h 2], then there are two locally stable steady states and one
unstable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 argues that whether there are two or three steady states depends on the
initial human capital of the country. Two of them are locally stable and one unstable. If the
initial level of human capital is greater than the threshold h2 the whole economy converges
to the low fertility, high nutrition and high human capital equilibrium hss3 which is locally
stable. On the other hand if the initial human capital lies in hss3 <h 2 then the total
economy converges to the low nutrition, high fertility and low levels of human capital which
is the poverty trap (see Figure 2).
There are several international organizations (the World Food Programme (WFP), Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNESCO etc.) that provide food aid to developing
countries not only to relief short-term hunger but also to help them out of poverty. In
the following sections, we will evaluate the di erent foreign aid policies that WFP has
implemented.
4 Foreign food aid
In this section, we will explore the di erent ways to escape from the poverty trap and to
help countries achieve economic development. There are a variety of ways to escape from
the poverty trap: in particular, changing the initial conditions of the system by foreign
aid, or a parallel rise in the transition function ht+1. More precisely, we will examine the
aid provided by the WFP, and investigate whether all aid programs are equally e cient in
helping countries to escape from the poverty trap.
The WFP provides food to developing countries. Some of its main activities are to
implement feeding programs in schools, procure food for households, supply ﬁnancial aid
for local farmers and local economies in general, and provide emergency aid in di cult
situations. In the following subsection, we explore the implications of feeding programs in
schools, in Subsection 2, we assume that WFP subsidizes the cost of child nutrition and as
a result decreases its price. In Subsection 3, the e ects of WFP providing a ﬁxed amount of
nutrition to households is studied, while Subsection 4 considers the e cacy of WFP ﬁnancial
support of local farmers and local food industries in improving the quality of nutrition and
the infrastructure of the developing country.
114.1 Feeding programs in school
WFP’s school meal programs work towards achieving several Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs)6. They directly address the goals set for 2015 of reducing hunger by half, and
achieving universal primary education and gender parity in education. In particular, WFP
has become the largest organizer of school feeding programs in the developing world. In 2003,
WFP fed more than 15 million children in schools in 69 countries. Working with national
governments, local authorities, donors and international and local aid groups, WFP uses
food to attract children to school and to keep them there.
The WFP transfers available resources to children at each period t in order to improve
the human capital according to the following rule. A ﬁxed quantity of nutrition T per unit
of time is transferred to each child in education.
The child’s survival probability is given by:
 t =( mt + T(et + q)))  (13)
where T(et + q) stands for the meals given to the child during the time he/she spends in
school. The movement of human capital is given by:
ht+1 =( mt + T(et + q)) 1(et + q) 2h
1  1  2
t . (14)
The survival probability and human capital accumulation both depend on the nutrition
provided by parents and the foreign aid which is the school meals. The total nutrition is
Mt = mt + T(et + q).
Maximizing the welfare of Equation (3) subject to Equations (5) and (14) yields the
following optimal solutions for education, nutrition and fertility:
et =
 
         
         
0 ht   h1(T),
 2[ht   ]
(  T)(1  1  2  )   qh 1(T) <h t <h 2(T),
1   qh t   h2(T),
(15)
where h1(T)=
q(1  1  2  )(  T)+ 2 
 2  and h2(T)=
 (1  1  ) T(1  1  2  )
  2 are thresholds
and depend on T.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, h1 and h2 decrease whenever T increases.
Proof. See Appendix C.
6The Millennium Development Goals are: 1)to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2)to achieve univer-
sal primary education; 3) to promote gender equality and empower women; 4) to reduce child mortality; 5)to
improve maternal health; 6)to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) to ensure environmental
sustainability; and 8) to develop a global partnership for development.
12The threshold levels of human capital decrease with T. Changes in policy alter behavior
with respect to fertility, nutrition and human capital investments. After introducing school
feeding programs, the total optimal nutrition of children depends on the nutrition provided
by parents and by the school meals. The optimal total nutrition of children is:
Mt = mt + T(et + q)=
 
           
           
( + 1)[ht   (1 q) Tq)
(1    1) ht   h1(T),
( 1+ )
(1  1  2  )[ht     ] h1(T) <h t <h 2(T),
( + 1)[ht  T(1+q)]
(1    1) ht   h2(T).
(16)
As can be seen in Figure 3, the total level of nutrition of children is still an increasing
function of human capital. The total nutrition is lower than the benchmark in the low
regime because of T, and remains at the benchmark level in the second (middle-income)
regime, which is independent of T.
Figure 3: Nutrition and fertility with school feeding programs




           
           
( + 1)(h   )
1  1   +
[[ + 1]  T]q
1  1   ht   h1(T)
( 1+ )
(1  1  2  )[ht     ]  
T 2[[ht   ]
(  T)(1  1  2  ) h1(T) <h t <h 2(T)
( + 1)(ht ) T(1+q)
1    1 ht   h2(T).
(17)
13Fertility depends on the level of T. Fertility increases and nutrition decreases with T com-
pared to those of the benchmark model. The product of the quality/quantity trade-o 7 is
independent of T, and remains the same as that in the benchmark model8. This means that,
as parents increase the number of their children, they will decrease the amount of nutrition
provided to each child. Compared to the benchmark model, fertility is a decreasing function
of human capital(see Figure 3).
nt =
 
           
           
(1    1)ht 
(1+ )((ht   (1 q)) Tq) ht   h1(T),
 ht(1  1  2  )
(1+ )(ht   ) h1(T) <h t <h 2(T),
(1    1) ht
((1+ )(ht ) (1+q)T) ht   h2(T).
(18)
Equations (16) and (17) show that feeding programs in school decrease the amount of
nutrition parents give their children in all regimes. Education has a negative e ect on the
total child nutrition provided by parents because it prevents children from working. In
poor developing countries, foreign food aid decreases not only total nutrition but also total
human capital. Here, there is a trade-o  between the number of children a family has and
the human capital developed in each child. In the interval ht   h1(T) , school feeding
programs increase fertility by reducing the "quantity cost" of children, thereby shifting
resources from the quality to the quantity of children. In other words, parents decrease the
nutrition of their o spring and increase their number. This trade-o  takes place as long as
the ﬁxed commodity, T, is su ciently small (see Equations (10) and (19)). This result is
consistent with Azarnet’s (2008) ﬁnding that humanitarian aid increases fertility by reducing
the investment of parents in their children education, and consequently their accumulation
of human capital. Neanidis (2010) also found that when the average aid per adult increased,
so did the fertility rate, because the "quantity cost" of children was reduced. This shifted
resources from the quality of children to their quantity.
The main di erences between Neanidis’s (2010) contribution and the model we are using
are: 1) in our model aid does not reduce the childbearing time but does reduce the investment
parents make in the nutrition of their children; 2) the survival probability depends on both
the nutrition provided by parents and that coming from foreign aid. It is important to
mention that as the total nutrition level decreases, the survival probability decreases. This
shows that there is an inverse relation between fertility and survival probability, which is
consistent with Agenor’s (2009) ﬁndings.9
Proposition 3 summarizes the e ect of school feeding programs on the optimal choices
of parents with respect to the number and quality of their o spring:
Proposition 3. School Feeding programs generate a substitution e ect away from quality
of children toward quantity of children in poor developing countries if T is small.
7This trade-o  is more obvious in developing countries than in developed ones. In a developing country
such as India, Burundi, which has neither a well-functioning public education system nor generous support
for childbearing and childcare, the cost of quality is mostly borne by the parents. However there is also some
evidence for a quality/quantity trade-o  in studies of public health in developing countries. See for instance
Karmaus and Botezan (2002).
8Since the utility function is logarithmic, the quality/quantity trade-o  is a constant fraction of household
income.
9Agenor (2009) argues that if the survival probability of children decreases there is an increase in the
demand for children.
14Proposition 4 implies that:
• Parents decrease their investment in nutrition if T is su ciently small (proof : see
Equation (16)).
• When T is su ciently small, parents increase the number of their children (proof : see
Equation (18)).
This proposition is valid as long as the ﬁxed commodity T is smaller than the nutrition
provided by parents. When T is higher than
( + 1)((1  1  ) )
(1  1  2  )( + 1)+ 2 parents decide to stop
providing food at home and school meals constitute the total nutrition of children 10. Hence,
the human capital accumulation of children depends only on foreign aid. If this aid is higher
than
( + 1)((1  1  ) )
(1  1  2  )( + 1)+ 2 the poor country can escape from the poverty trap.
Proposition 4. For values of T higher than
( + 1)((1  1  ) )
(1  1  2  )( + 1)+ 2 parents stop providing
food at home, and the children’s nutrition depends on the level of nutrition of foreign food
aid. In this situation poor countries can escape from the poverty trap.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Consequently, we conclude that the WFP should o er large quantities of school meals
in developing countries if it wants to keep children in school, and ameliorate hunger and
poverty.
Foreign aid has di erent results in middle-income countries. More precisely, school feed-
ing programs increase the length of time children stay in school time, and as result chil-
dren work less. School feeding programs are thus very e ective in reducing child labor in
middle-income countries. Furthermore, they lead to an improvement in human capital and
produce better conditions for the generations to come (see Chandler, Walker, Connelly and
Grantham-McGregor, 1995; Chang, Walker, Himes and Grantham-McGregor, 1996). Hu-
man capital increases only through the channel of education, because the total nutrition
stays the same as without the feeding program. This result is conﬁrmed by four studies
which show that the beneﬁt to nutrition from school meals was less than expected in areas
like Peru (Jacoby et al., 1996); Jamaica (Powell et al., 1983); Kenya (Murphy et al., 2003)
and India (Agarwai et al., 1989). The authors of two of these studies concluded that children
who were o ered a substantial supplement at school were provided with less food at home
(substitution).
Propositions 5 and 6 summarizes these results.
Proposition 5. School feeding programs increases the length of schooling and reduce child
labor in middle-income countries.
Proposition 6. In middle income developing countries, school feeding programs do not
improve children’s overall nutrition, but they do increase the length of time that children
stay in school.
• These two propositions imply that that total human capital increases when school
feeding programs are implemented in middle-income countries (Proof see Equations
(16), (17) and (18)).
10In this situation, the optimal choices for total nutrition and fertility change
15Feeding programs in school have positive implications that are not captured by this
model. In particular, in developing countries, school meals can provide short-term hunger
relief, since in the poorest areas families may not have enough basic food for their children.
School meals can also a ect help with HIV/AIDS, orphans, disabled and former soldiers  
categories that are not included in our model.
Looking at the total welfare of parents at the di erent levels of human capital (regimes),
we can see that there are ambiguous e ects in the ﬁrst regime and improvements in the
second.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is evidence (e.g. Bro, Shank, Williams and
McLaughlin (1994; 1996) which show that a generous breakfast cooked in a practical class
before the school day began improved students’ attention to set tasks. Their data also
suggests that a school meal can be a social event that stimulates and motivates the students.
This aspect is not captured by my model.
4.2 Food provision in households
In this part of the analysis, we assume that WFP provides two forms of aid: ﬁrst, it subsidizes
the price of food, and second, it provides a ﬁxed amount of nutrition to each child in a
household. We assume that all the households of the recipient country receive this kind of
humanitarian aid.
4.2.1 Subsidizing the cost of feeding children or procurement by the WFP
Food prices in developing countries have declined since 2008 but remain much higher than
in previous years. The high cost of food continues to raise concern for the food security of
populations in urban and rural areas, who spend a large proportion of their incomes on food
(see for instance FAO, 2009). Consequently, the WFP tries not only to stabilize food prices
but also to reduce them by subsidies.
In this subsection we assume that the WFP purchases food at the most advantageous
price, taking into account the cost of transport and shipping, with a preference towards
local or regional procurement in developing countries whenever possible(see for instance
WFP (2006b) on Egypt).
We assume that WFP buys a percentage of each child’s nutritional requirements,  t,
which is given to each child’s family as a voucher or as cash which may only be spent on
food for children, Assume that the price of nutrition is 1. Thus the WFP’s contribution is
 tmtnt in each household. This aid takes the form of a WFP project providing continuous
aid for several years in a developing country, or it is bilateral food aid supplied by government
to government. Later the government provides this food to households without cost.
Of course there are certain types of food aid that can actually be destructive. Dumping
food on poor nations (i.e. free, subsidized, or cheap food, below the market price) undercuts
local farmers, who cannot compete and are driven out of jobs and into poverty. We exclude
this kind of aid from my framework. The food that parents provide for their children
constitutes their total nutrition.
Young adults’ welfare, as described in Equation (3), can be maximized under the budget
constraint
ct + (1    t)mtnt = ht(1    nt)+ (1   et   q)nt, (19)
16and the motion of human capital given by Equation (4).
The optimal choices for education, nutrition and fertility are
et =
 
         
         
0 ht   h1,
 2[ht   ]
 (1  1  2  )   qh 1 <h t <h 2,
1   qh t   h2.
(20)
The thresholds h1 and h2 are deﬁned in the benchmark model. The level of education
remains the same as before the aid was provided (see Equation (8)).
Mt = mt =
 
           
           
( + 1)(ht   (1 q))
(1    1)(1  t) ht   h1,
( + 1)(ht   ))
(1    1  2)(1  t) h1 <h t <h 2
( + 1)(ht )
(1    1)(1  t) ht   h2.
(21)
Equation (21) shows that the nutrition of children increases in all regimes (see Figure
4). Low prices for nutrition allow parents to spend more on it than before. Thus, the total
level of nutrition increases.
nt =
 
           
           
(1    1)ht 
(1+ )(ht   (1 q)) ht   h1,
 ht(1  1  2  )
(1+ )(ht   ) h1 <h t <h 2,
(1    1) 
(1+ )  ht   h2.
(22)
Equation (22) shows that the level of fertility is not a ected by the availability of this foreign
aid.
17Figure 4: Nutrition and Fertility with subsidizing food
Proposition 7. There is a level of  t which allows a country to escape from the poverty
trap. This level is given by:
 t > 1  
h




 1 (  +  1)(h1     (1   q))
(1        1)
.
Proof. See Appendix E.
As pointed out earlier, the allocation of time to education remains the same as in the
no-aid scenario. On other hand, there is an improvement in the nutrition level, leading to an
improvement in human capital. This kind of aid raises the probability of a child’s survival,
thereby indirectly reducing fertility, while at the same time contributing to children’s health
status though improving nutrition. Neanidis (2010) reported a similar result. This has a
positive e ect on growth and it allows poor developing countries to escape from the poverty
trap when aid reaches a certain value (see Proposition 8). However children will continue
to work and there is no reduction in child labor if the level of aid is low. The reduction of
child labor is an indirect consequence of the increase in human capital through nutrition. In
other words, food aid programs may have positive intergenerational e ects, which can lead
the developing countries out of poverty.
Looking at the total welfare of parents, we can see that food provision to households
produces an improvement in welfare in all regimes. As mentioned above, this aid can have
a negative impact on the economy if the WFP does not subsidize food prices, but buys a
percentage of the subsidized food from outside the country. The main reason is that the
majority of people in developing countries are farmers, and such aid can lower their incomes.
In this framework, we assume that either the government or the WFP buys food from local
providers. This assumption has an indirect e ect on the income of the total economy that
is not captured by the model.
4.2.2 Food provision to households
In this subsection, we investigate the situation where the WFP provides a ﬁxed amount of
nutrition for each child in a household. A nice example of this the situation in Pakistan in
2010, where the WFP provided 36,500 metric tons of food aid to assist families. This aid can
18provide a small amount of supplemental feeding for each child in a household. Supplemental
feeding is available to poor households, which are unable to cover the expenses of feeding
their children. In our model, we assume that each household in the receipient country
receives this kind of aid.
Maximizing the utility function of young adults (Equation (3)) subject to the budget
constraint (Equation (5)) yields the following equation for changes in human capital:
ht+1 =( mt +¯ m) 1(et + q) 2h
1  1  2
t . (23)
Total nutrition depends on the food provided by parents and the ﬁxed amount of nutrition,
¯ mt, provided by the WFP, where Mt = mt +¯ m. As a result, the survival probability is
 t =( mt +¯ m) .
The optimal choices are then:
et =
 
         
         
0 ht   h1(¯ m),
 2[ht   ) ( 2)¯ m
( (1  1  2  )   qh 1(¯ m) <h t <h 2(¯ m),
1   qh t   h2(¯ m).
(24)
where h1(¯ m)=
(q(1  1  2  )+ 2) + 2 ¯ m
 2  and h2(¯ m)=
((1  1  ) + 2 ¯ m
 2  depend on ¯ m. Equation
(24) shows that the length of schooling decreases when this kind of aid is provided to middle-
income countries. With the optimal choices of nutrition and fertility, the total level of nutri-
tion, the nutrition provided by parents and the fertility all decrease as the amount of food
provided to households increases.
mt =
 
           
           
( + 1)(wtht  wt (1 q)  ¯ m
1    1 ht   h1(¯ m)
( + 1)(wtht  wt ) (1  2)¯ m
1    1  2 h1(¯ m) <h t <h 2(¯ m)
( + 1)(wtht )  ¯ m
1    1 ht   h2(¯ m)
(25)
As highlighted above, children’s total nutrition is the sum of the nutrition provided by
parents and the ﬁxed amount of nutrition available from the WFP. Thus, the following




           
           
( + 1)(ht   (1 q) [ + 1]¯ m
1    1 ht   h1(¯ m),
( + 1)(ht   ) ( + 1)¯ m
1    1  2 h1(¯ m) <h t <h 2(¯ m),
( + 1)(ht ) ( + 1)¯ m
1    1 ht   h2(¯ m).
(26)
19Parents decrease the nutrition provided to their children and they increase the number
of their children such that the product of the quantity/quality trade-o  remains the same as




           
           
(1    1)ht 
(1+ )(ht   (1 q))  ¯ m) ht   h1(¯ m,)
 ht(1  1  2  )
(1+ )(ht     ¯ m) h1(¯ m) <h t <h 2(¯ m),
(1    1) ht
(1+ )(ht   ¯ m) ht   h2(¯ m).
(27)
Figure 5: Nutrition and fertility with ﬁxed food input from the WFP
These results show that providing ﬁxed amounts of food does not solve the poverty
problem. In particular, if the WFP continues to provide a ﬁxed amount of food to households
in middle income developing countries, it can lead to increased deprivation. This kind of
aid does not only decrease the total level of nutrition of children, but also the length of time
they spend in schooling. Parents decide not only to reduce their investment in the health
of their children through nutrition, but also the time that their children spend at school.
However they increase the number of their children, so that the quality/quantity trade-o 
remains the same as in the benchmark model.
Proposition 8 summarizes the e ect of school feeding programs on the optimal choices
of parents with respect to the number and quality of their o spring.
Proposition 8. Fixed amount of nutrition provided to households by the WFP generate
a substitution e ect away from quality of children toward quantity of children in poor and
middle income developing countries when ¯ m is small.
This implies that:
• Parents decrease their investment in the nutrition of their children if ¯ m is su ciently
small (proof see Equations (25) and (26)).
• Parents increase their total fertility (proof : see Equation (27)).
20• In middle-income countries parents decrease not only their investment in their chil-
dren’s nutrition but also their length of schooling (proof see Equations:(24), (26) and
(27)).
This proposition implies that, when ¯ m is below the level of nutrition that parents can
a ord, countries are locked into the poverty trap. When ¯ m is higher than
( + 1) 
 2 , parents
decide to stop paying for food and childrenÕs total nutrition is equal to the ﬁxed amount
provided by the WFP11. Hence, the human capital accumulation of children depends only
on the foreign aid provided by WFP. If this aid is higher than
( + 1) 
 2 the poor country can
escape from the poverty trap.
Proposition 9. For values of ¯ m higher than
( + 1) 
 2 parents stop buying food at home.
Therefore, the children’s nutrition depends solely on the level of nutrition they can get from
foreign aid. In this case, poor countries can escape from the poverty trap.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Poor countries can escape from the poverty only if the WFP o ers a large amount of
food to households. Then, as in school feeding programs, parents stop o ering food to their
children and children’s total nutrition consists of the ﬁxed amount of aid. This kind of aid
actually hurts the recipient countries, and WFP should consider carefully where such aid
should be provided. Looking at the welfare of parents, there are ambiguous e ects in the
ﬁrst regime (where levels of human capital are low), but welfare decreases in the second. It is
important to mention that this kind of aid is important even if this result was not expected.
Aid can provide short-term hunger relief to poor countries when terrible events happen.
4.3 Other strategies to help developing countries escape from the
poverty trap
In this subsection, we consider various foreign aid policies which have not been mentioned
above. Most foreign aid policies cover improvements in infrastructure, in the hope that this
will lead to a parallel shift up of the transitory function ht+1. This type of aid is e cient
and can lead developing countries out of the poverty trap. In particular, any improvement
in infrastructure and quality of food increases the technological level, B, of human capital
accumulation.
There are some programs such as Food for Work and/or Training (FWT) which provide
food in exchange for labor in public works projects (such as the development of rural in-
frastructure, roads, or irrigation schemes). These can stimulate the local economy and lay
the foundation for the development of a secure local capacity. FWT not only provides food
for the workers in the short run but also improves the infrastructure which has a positive
impact on communities and the country in the long run.
There are also national organizations which provide food in clinics and in other health
institutions to combat malnutrition for the poor and the sick. Kraak et al.(1999) show
this kind of food aid directly beneﬁts poor people, and improves the diet of people with
HIV/AIDS. Moreover, governments, interested in improvements to nutrition, try to ﬁnd
11When the food needs of children are based only on the ﬁxed amount of foreign aid, the optimal choices
for total nutrition and fertility change. In this situation, developing countries can temporarily escape from
the poverty trap. If the WFP decides to reduce the amount of ﬁxed food and parents start to provide food
for their children again, the countries fall back into poverty (see second regime). Such aid is usually provided
in situations where parents cannot o er food to their children (natural disasters and war).
21donors who are willing to ﬁnance health programs and to contribute to the health infras-
tructure of their country (see, for instance, the report of Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations for Namibia, ESC-UN 2010). Aid to the health sector often targets mothers
and children. These exogenous interventions aim not only to reduce infant mortality, under-
weight rates, and micronutrient deﬁciencies but also to improve and develop human capital
and the economic growth of the country.
The WFP invests in local food industries in developing countries to enable it to ﬁnd local
sources for blended and fortiﬁed foods. Thanks to such work, food quality is improving. For
instance, in 2004, the WFP decided that local food processors in Southern Africa should
conform to international standards so as to control quality for the entire manufacturing
process in the region. With a grant from the Government of Canada, an extensive study
was launched to provide support to the WFP in this e ort. Thus, the WFP supported local
processors in the food sector and helped Southern Africa meet quality standards.
All these types of aid programs can be captured in my model by B, which is the tech-
nological level or e ciency parameter of human capital. We assume that improvements
in the quality of food (Fogel, 1994, Kraak et al., 1999) and health(Shultz, 1961; Kuznets,
1966; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) can raise the e ciency and the labor productivity of
adults and children. Hence unpredictable exogenous improvements in health infrastructure
and in the local food industries can increase the e ciency of human capital, B, and as a
consequence the changes in human capital. All these exogenous shocks have positive results
in economic growth and help to reduce poverty. Equation 31 illustrates the rise in B which
is needed for a poor country to escape the poverty trap.
B>
h1
[h1     (1   q)] 1q 2h
1  1  2
1 [  +  1] 1
(28)
22Figure 6: Increasing B
Figure 6 illustrates the increase in B that induces the changes in human capital to move
upwards. This type of aid can provide a big push towards solving the problem of poverty of
developing countries.
5 Computational Experiment
In this section, we shall examine the quantitative implications of both the benchmark and
the extensions of my model. The calibration was carried out with values taken from the
existing literature. The weight,  , of children in the utility function governs the growth rate
of population in the balanced growth path. This parameter is set to 0.216, as in Fernandez-
Villaverde and Kruger (2004). A similar value was used by Attanasio, Kitao and Violante
(2010).
The technological level of human capital B is set to 1 for simplicity. The time cost
parameter   for having children deﬁnes the overall opportunity cost of having children.
Although they do not include child labor in their model, we use the same value for as  
de la Croix and Doepke (2003), i.e. 0.075. De la Croix and Doepke used evidence from
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Knowles (1999) which suggests that the opportunity cost of
a child is equal to 15% of the parents’ time endowment. This cost only accumulates while
the child is living with the parents. They argue that if children live with their parents for
15 years, and the adult period lasts for 30 years, the overall time cost should be 50% of the
time cost per year when the child is present.
This parameter   also sets an upper limit on the number of children a person can have.
Using these ﬁgures, people who spend all their time raising children would have, on average,
slightly over 13 children each.
23The productivity of children is set to  = 0.0006 12. This is an arbitrary value and in the
section on sensitivity analysis we investigate its behavior. We select this low value of the
variable because child labor laws restrict the use of child labor (Doepke, 2004). In addition
 >  has to be set so as to ensure the positivity of the optimal choices. The theoretical
reasoning is that the parents’ cost must be higher than that of not having children (otherwise
the children would live separately from their parents). Furthermore, we assume that, in a
one sector model with homogenous agents, the productivity of children remains the same
and is not inﬂuenced by their human capital.
The elasticity of survival probability,  , is set to 0.1. This is an arbitrary value that
is used in the sensitivity analysis of my numerical example. In particular, we ﬁnd that an
increase in   leads to an increase in the level of nutrition that parents provide for their
children. There is also an increase in the length of schooling and consequently in human
capital.
The value of time in primary school, q, is set to 0.1 in line with Assumption 4.
The process of calibrating the elasticities of human capital accumulation still need to be
discussed. Before we start this analysis, we will estimate the elasticities of human capital
for developing countries in order to calibrate the theoretical framework13 and investigate its
main dynamics. As an econometric technique, we use constrained OLS regression, since we
need the sum of the elasticities to be equal to one. The data for our regression, is taken
from a group of developing countries. Taking the logarithms of Equation 5 the motion of
human capital can be written as:
ln(ht+1)= 1 ln(mt)+ 2 ln(et + q) + (1    1    2)ln(ht)+ t. (29)
The empirical literature (see for instance Becker, 1974; Lee and Lee, 1995) mostly uses enroll-
ment rates at school as a proxy for human capital. However that is not possible here because
my model of the changes in human capital depend on education, nutrition and parental hu-
man capital. Consequently, we use the approach adopted by Bils and Klenow (2000) to
avoid problems of endogeneity and correlation between the variables. Their methodology
allows to us to obtain a proxy for human capital, by taking the stock of human capital
stock as the dependent variable and enrolment rates at school as the independent variable
in the regression, thereby avoiding endogeneity bias14. This human capital stock consists of
12In the numerical example for the second regime, we take  =0.006, for two reasons. First, the value is
arbitrary, and can therefore be set at any level; and second because  = 0.0006 is too small and is inversely
related to education. If this ﬁgure is used the high steady state is achieved without international aid, since
the second equilibrium is unstable. Since we want to show the inﬂuence of the various foreign aid programs
we take  =0.006. If this value is used in the ﬁrst regime, where human capital is low, parents stop feeding
their children, whose nutrition status is therefore based only on foreign aid, particularly for school feeding
programs
13In previous studies (Azariadis et al. 2004; Quan, 1993, 1996) persistent poverty can be explained
by poverty traps. But persistent poverty and emergent bimodality can be used as a proof that poverty
traps explain the data. In this paper, we do not try to investigate the existence of poverty traps empirically.
Lacking su cient data, we try to estimate the coe cients of the changes in human capital for an homogenous
sample (developing countries). According to the assumptions of my model, these changes are constant. The
reason for undertaking this regression is to calibrate the model. To test the robustness of my results we
provide a sensitivity analysis with numbers taken from previous studies.
14Since human capital depends only on the percentage gains in human capital from each year of education,
and experience is independent of the enrollment rates. Thus, we can regress the human capital stock on the
enrollment rates.
24the percentage gains in human capital from each year of education and experience. More
precisely, Bils and Klenow (2000) constructed human capital stocks from 1960 to 1990 by
country as follows. They ﬁrst constructed an estimate of human capital for workers at each
age from 25 to 59 for both 1960 and 1990 incorporating schooling, experience and teacher’s
human capital speciﬁc to each age. Then, using population weights by age, they weighted
the age-speciﬁc human capitals into an aggregate for 25 to 59-year- olds. Their measure of
human capital for an individual is based on Mincer’s (1991) model of human capital accumu-
lation generalized for an impact from the human capital of the previous generation. It also
allows for experience to have a quadratic form in their model. Returns to experience and
experience-squared are chosen such that the experience/earnings proﬁles mimic the average
proﬁle of the sample of Mincer’s estimates. They calculated educational attainment because
an individual’s human capital is a function of the human capital in past cohorts15. Their
analysis is based on surveys compiled by the United Nations and reported in two UNESCO
publications on the Statistics of Educational Attainment and Illiteracy (1977, 1983) and the
Penn Word tables Summers and Heston, 1991).
As mentioned above, Bils and Klenow’s technique allowed them to regress human cap-
ital stocks with schooling without problems of endogeneity and correlation. We adopt the
same methodology and use the Penn World tables, the UNESCO publications and Mincer’s
earnings estimations as given in the appendix of their paper to obtain the human capital
stocks for 1960 and 1990. These represent two di erent generations for our model since
each generation lasts for approximately 30 years. Thus we consider that lnh60 = lnht and
lnh90 = ht+1 in our model. There are 66 developing countries in our data set. There is
insu cient data from other countries for them to be included in the data set. This regres-
sion is only used to estimate the coe cients needed to calibrate our model. Later, we will
provide a sensitivity analysis of them. For the length of schooling, we use data from the
Barro-Lee(1993) and World Bank databases.
In considering nutrition, we use the approach adopted by Arcand (2001) FAO (1996)
who took the prevalence of food inadequacy (PFI) 16 as a proxy for nutrition17. Our data
came from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (1996)18.
Assuming that the error term is log normal multiplicative, Table 1 presents the results
of our constraint OLS regression. 19. We use constraint regression as method of estimation
since we need to keep the sum of elasticities of human capital equal to one.
The group of countries considered in the analysis is small because no more data is avail-
able using Bils and Klenow’s (2000) technique. We control for heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation 20. All the variables were signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This is in accord with
Bils and Klenow (2000), Arcand (2001) and Wang et al.Õs (2003) results. Specially, these
studies have shown that nutrition status is signiﬁcant in the long run, and has an impact
on the rate of growth of real GDP per capita.
Abdus and Rangazas (2010) chose a value of 0.304 for the returns of education to human
capital. Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000) used the same approach as Bils and Klenow
15For more details, see Bils and Klenow(2000)
16PFI is a measure which involves comparing household food consumption with a minimum dietary energy
requirement, and the classiﬁcation of individuals in households with per capital calorie consumption levels
below the minimum requirement as being in the undernourished category.
17Arcand (2001) used several variables as proxies for nutrition, including PFI and the Dietary Energy
Supply(DES). He claims that there is a measurement error in the DES indicators constructed by the FAO.
Hence, we prefer to use PFI.
18All the data can be provided after request to the author
19The regression takes into account the assumptions of the theoretical model to ensure the positivity of
the coe cients i.e. Assumption 1.
20we use the command ’Robust’ in STATA to control for heteroskedasticity.
25(2000), and imposed a value of 0.32. Consequently, my coe cient for education is close to
that used by other researchers. Table 2 summarizes the values of the parameters.
Table 2: Values of the parameters
 1 0.2  2 0.25
  0.1   0.0006
  0.075   0.216
Assuming that the parameters were set at their baseline, we compute the e ects of foreign
food aid on child nutrition, length of schooling, level of human capital and fertility. The ﬁrst
analysis concerned the value of such aid that allows a developing country to escape from
the poverty trap. The second focused on a simulation in which the intergenerational e ect
of foreign food aids, in particular feeding programs and price subsidies for nutrition, were
compared to the development of the system in the absence of these aids. The simulation
exercise was carried out under two di erent production functions. In the ﬁrst scenario, we
use Yt = Ht (as in the theoretical section) and in the second, Yt = H 
t , where   is set at
0.3321.
5.1 Values that allow the poverty trap to be escaped
The values of foreign food aid which allow a country to escape from the poverty trap are
summarized in Table 3.
Insert Table 3
 t is 0.96. This means that organizations such as WFP should provide 96% of the nutrition
that parents buy for their children. At this percentage the country can escape of the poverty
trap. This value is much too high. It is obvious that it is di cult to solve poverty by foreign
food aid alone.
Since the productivity of human capital, B, is set at 1, an increase of 100% in this value
would be needed. Investing in local food industries, so that the quality of food increased, or
investing in the agricultural sector by subsidizing local farmers, would lead this economy out
of poverty only if the investment were su ciently high. This result is in line with previous
research (Harris, 2003; Smedley and Kinniburg; 2001) which argue that the investments in
infrastructure and the support for local industries should be high if developing countries are
to achieve economic development.
Finally, in the above table, we present the value of the ﬁxed commodity that is provided
as a meal in school or at home at which parents decide to stop feeding their children at home,
and which also releases the country from poverty. This value is T=0.0032 and ¯ m=0.00069
22.
5.2 Computational experiment
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the ﬁrst and second regimes under two di erent production
functions, the linear one and the diminishing returns to scale. The levels of nutrition,
21In this situation wages are no longer constant, and so the boundaries between the regimes (i.e. developing
and middle-income countires) are not constant, since succeeding regimes move over time and cannot be
characterized analytically.
22The maximum T and ¯ m are units of commodities
26human capital, fertility and length of schooling before and after the school feeding or price
subsidy programs are presented. The values for the total nutrition represent the amount of
commodity needed. Length of education is the number of years spent at secondary school





Predictions have been computed for three generations (i.e. 120 years, each generation lasting
30 years). This computational experiment is used to investigate the e ects of the implemen-
tation of the two di erent production functions for foreign aid in the two regimes. We also
investigate whether my theoretical results are robust under the two di erent production
functions (linear and diminishing returns)23. The results are similar for both production
functions. Similar results were found by Hansen and Tarp (2001), Economides et al. (2008)
and Daalgard et al. (2004), who showed that whether the aggregate aid impacts on growth
positively or negatively is independent of the production function.
Tables 4 and 6 show that school feeding programs increase the length of schooling and
as a result there is an improvement in human capital. In the theoretical part of this article
we show that the total nutrition initially remains the same (Jacoby et al., 1996; Powell et
al., 1983; Murphy et al., 2003 and Agarwai et al., 1989). However it increases after two
generations (see Tables 4 and 6, Generation 3) through the intergenerational transmission
of human capital. This is a line with the empirical evidence (Simon, 1998).
On the other hand, Tables 5 and 7 show that low levels of commodity T reduce not only
the total nutrition but also the human capital. As a consequence, the total economy of the
developing country is locked in the poverty trap. In particular, there is a quantity/quality
trade-o . Parents decrease the nutrition they provide for their children, total nutrition
decreases, and they increase the number of children they have. Since there is a decrease in
human capital, the negative consequences become even worse across the generations in poor
developing countries.
If WFP subsidizes the price of food, the total level of nutrition increases. This is easy to
understand. Having the same income, parents can provide higher levels of nutrition to their
children and hence their human capital increases in both regimes.
It is worth noting that both types of foreign aid reduce the prevalence of child labor.
Child labor is a phenomenon in all developing countries, but is socially undesirable24.
Thus, we can conclude that these two types of foreign food aid not only reduce short term
hunger and improve human capital, but also increase the length of schooling, especially in
middle-income countries. This is true for both direct (school feeding programs) and indirect
(subsidizing food prices) programs.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
This last subsection provides a sensitivity analysis for the parameters. All the above tables
illustrate the baseline parameters used in the numerical example. Now, we present the e ects
of variations in the parameters on the main variables, namely nutrition resources, length of
schooling and human capital.
23With diminishing returns, the wage is not constant and depends on the population. There are no
analytical solutions incorporating this production function. Thus the calibration is necessary.
24According to UNICEF, there are an estimated 158 million children aged 5 to 14 in child labor worldwide,
excluding child domestic labor
27Insert Table 8
Insert Table 9
First, let us consider the parameter  1 which represents the return to nutrition and includes
the direct e ects of nourishment on human capital. When  1 is decreased so are the resources
dedicated to child nutrition. On the other hand, the human capital and the length of
schooling increase. The reverse results are obtained by varying the return to schooling,  2.
Another important parameter is  , children’s earnings from work when the production
function is Yt = Ht). This parameter has an inverse relationship to the length of schooling,
and the higher it is the less likely children are to attend school. On the other hand, it
increases nutrition resources, since there is more income in the family, and also increases
human capital.
If the elasticity of the survival probability,  , rises, so too do the level of nutrition, human
capital and education. This means that as the elasticity of the survival probability decreases,
parents spend more on the nutrition of their children to keep them alive. (Boucekkine and
La argue(2010) employ the same approach in their model25).
We do not provid sensitivity analyses for   and   since these two parameters have
straightforward e ects on fertility. In particular the e ects of increasing the time-cost of
bringing up a child,  , leads to a reduction in fertility but increases in education and nutrition
resources, and thus in human capital.
6 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to evaluate the e ciency of the various foreign food aid
programs provided by the WFP to developing countries.
We develop a two-period OLG model in which agents choose their present consumption,
the number of children they have, the length of the children’s schooling, and the amount
of resources dedicated to nutrition for each of their children. It is assumed that children
share the unit of their available time between work and education in accordance with the
decision their parents make. Like other researchers, we assume that children’s human capital
accumulation depends on their nutrition, education and parental human capital. Thus,
our framework captures the complementarity of child nutrition and child learning capacity
(see Curais et al., 2010). Multiple equilibria emerge from my benchmark model and may
explain the existence of poverty traps. In particular, countries with low human capital ﬁnd
themselves trapped in conditions of low nutrition, high child labor rates, and high fertility
rates.
We extend our model to mimic four di erent foreign aid policies provided by the WFP.
First, we examine the case where WFP provides school meals in developing countries. School
meals provide an enhancement to children’s nutrition status, and, as a consequence, in
our model they improve the human capital accumulation and the survival rate of children.
However school meals appear to lock poor developing countries into poverty. In particular,
this aid increases fertility, because the cost of having children decreases. Thus parents invest
less in the nutrition of their children, leading to a slowdown in human capital accumulation.
The recipient economy is locked into a poverty trap. However, if the WFP provides a large
amount of food in schools, parents decide to stop feeding their children at home, and their
total nutrition depends only on the school meals. The developing country can then escape
from the poverty trap. School feeding programs are particularly e cient for middle-income
25In contrast to my framework they consider that when there is a mortality shock and the survival
probability of adults decreases, there will be an increase in their investment in health.
28countries. More precisely, they increase the length of schooling and improve the human
capital for future generations even though the total nutrition remains unchanged (Jacoby et
al., 1996; Powell et al., 1983; Murphy et al., 2003 and Agarwai et al., 1989). Consequently,
middle-income countries can achieve economic development.
Second, we explore the e ects of the WFP subsidizing the price of food for households.
This program can be characterized as very e cient when the level of subsidy is high, as
shown by the calibration of the model. It allows poor countries to escape from poverty
because there is an income e ect. Now, parents can a ord to provide more nutrition for
their children. The total nutrition rises and therefore the survival probability of children
and their human capital.
However the policy of proving a constant level of nutrition to all households is not
e ective. Both poor and middle income countries sink into a poverty trap. This type of
foreign aid increases fertility, because the quantity cost of children falls. As a result, parents
decrease not only the nutrition level but also the length of schooling of their children.
Some WFP aid is used to improve the infrastructure of local food industries or support
local farmers ﬁnancially, so as to increase the quality of food and improve agricultural
productivity. This improvement is captured in our framework by the technological level
of my model of changes in human capital. An increase in the technological level raises
the human capital of future generations and hence poor countries can achieve economic
development.
Finally, we provide a computational experiment which shows that our theoretical results
are robust under di erent production functions. We also show that introducing school
feeding programs generates an indirect increase in total nutrition across the generations in
middle-income countries.
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34Appendices
A Proof of optimal choices
To prove that the optimal choice of nutrition is an increasing function in all the di erent
regimes (i.e. at all di erent levels of development) the maximum of each regime is compared
with the minimum of the next. In particular, the nutrition in the ﬁrst regime is compared
with that in the second, using the same value of h1 in both cases.
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0 < 1+ 2 which is valid.
The value of nutrition in the second regime is then compared with that in the third.
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0 < 1    2 which is valid since  2 is between zero and one.
When the levels of fertility across the di erent regimes are compared it can be seen, by
taking the derivative with respect to ht, that the fertility decreases with ht.
 nt
 ht =
  (1 q)
(1+ )2(ht   (1 q) < 0
Since all the parameters are positive, the fertility decreases as long as ht increases.
B Steady states
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Finally for the interval [h2, ) the equilibrium is
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C Proof of Proposition 1
1. To prove the existence of a unique steady state which is locally stable, I deﬁned two
functions. The ﬁrst function is the 45o line, f(ht)=ht(see Figure 1) and the second is
the ﬁrst regime of Equation (11), g(ht)=
( + 1)
 1(ht   (1 q))
 1h
1  1  2
t q
 2
(1  1  ) 1 . To prove
the existence of a unique steady state it is necessary to prove that the functions f and
g cross; or in other words to show that f(h) <g (h) for h =
 
  (which holds because of
Assumption 2) and that f(h1) >g (h1) (which is true because of Assumption 4). If the
g function is concave, then the steady state is locally stable and hence a poverty trap.
So the problem is to prove that g(ht)=
( + 1)
 1(ht   (1 q))
 1h
1  1  2
t q
 2
(1  1  ) 1 is a concave
function.
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The ﬁrst part is positive, the second part negative because the discriminant of the
quadratic polynomial is negative. Consequently, the second derivative is less than
zero. As a result, a unique steady state exists and it is locally stable.
For this proof, the equilibrium in the interval (h1,h 2] must be investigated. The equi-
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mulated human capital is ht+1 =
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as A and taking the ﬁrst derivative of the expression for changes in human capi-
tal in this interval gives
 ht+1
 ht = A( 1 +  2)[ht     ] 1+ 2 1 h
1  1  2
t + (1    1  
 2)h
 ( 1+ 2)
t A[ht   ] 1+ 2. When the steady state is plugged into this derivative we
can see that
 ht+1
 ht |hss2 > 1 and hss2 is unstable. This case is represented by Figure 2.
2. To prove the stability of the steady state in the interval [h2, ). Taking the ﬁrst deriva-
tive of the function ht+1 in the interval [h2, ) yields
 ht+1
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The steady state is hss3 =
 
( + 1) 
(1  1  )
   1
 2 . Substituting for the steady state in the
derivative above shows that
 ht+1
 ht = (1    2) > 0 since 0 < 2 < 1 and
 ht+1
 ht |hss3 < 1.
This proves that the steady state hss3 is locally stable.
36D Proof of Proposition 2
To derive the human capital thresholds with respect to T consider:  h1
 T =
 2q(1  1  2  )




 2(1  1  2  )
 2  < 0.
Since both these inequalities are negative, the proposition is proven.
E Proof of Proposition 4
The nutrition for the low regime is mt =
( + 1)[ht   (1 q) Tq)
(1    1) If T = mt, it means that
parents stop providing food at home. The threshold is known to depend on T and it is
given by h1(T)=
q(1  1  2  )(  T)+ 2 
 2  . Plugging in the value for h1 and solving for T
gives T=
( + 1)(1  1  ) )
(1  1  2  )( + 1)+ 2. mt cannot be negative so for values of T higher than this
level, childrenÕs nutrition is better than before and human capital accumulation depends
on foreign aid, ht+1 =( T(q)) 1+ 2h
1  1  2
t .
F Proof of Proposition 7
The ht+1 function needs to be higher than in the regime h1 to escape from the poverty trap.
Thus:
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This deﬁnes the proposition.
G Proof of Proposition 9
The nutrition in the low regime is
( + 1)(ht  wt (1 q) [ + 1]¯ m
1    1 . For ¯ m=mt this means that
the nutrition provided by parents is equal to zero. We know that the threshold depends
on T and equals h1(¯ m)=
(q(1  1  2  )+ 2) + 2 ¯ m
 2  .Plugging in h1 and solving for ¯ m gives
¯ m=
( + 1) 
 2 . For values of ¯ m higher than this level mt cannot be negative, thus the nutrition
of the children is higher than before, and human capital accumulation depends on the foreign
aid: ht+1 = (¯ m) 1+ 2h









Table 4: Linear production function (Regime 2)
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education Fertility
Without aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1 2
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66 1.8230
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27 3.79
Feeding programs with T=0.00009
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1 2
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1820 0.67 1.8229
Generation 3 0.0027 0.131 0.20 3.75
Food provided in households with  =0.8
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1 2
Generation 2 0.0263 0.183 0.66 1.82
Generation 3 0.0255 0.1797 0.63 1.91
Table 5: Linear production function (Regime 1)
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education Fertility
Without aid
Generation 1 0.12 0.1 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0030 0.1 Basic 1.7865
Generation 3 0.0014 0.05 Basic 1.9398
Feeding programs
Generation 1 0.12 0.1 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0029 0.09 Basic 1.788
Generation 3 0.0013 0.04 Basic 1.94
Food provided in households
Generation 1 0.12 0.1 Basic 2
Generation 2 00149 0.11 Basic 1.7864
Generation 3 00098 0.07 Basic 1.8531
38Table 6: Decreasing returns to scale (Regime 2)
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education Fertility
Without aid
Generation 1 0.18 0.18 0.002 1
Generation 2 0.0044 0.1696 0.6386 2.3982
Generation 3 0.0076 0.2257 0.5621 1.9632
Feeding programs
Generation 1 0.18 0.18 0.002 1
Generation 2 0.0044 0.17 0.65 2.39
Generation 3 0.0077 0.2266 0.57 1.95
Food provided in households
Generation 1 0.18 0.18 0.002 1
Generation 2 0.0219 0.17 0.63 2.3982
Generation 3 0.0398 0.2328 0.56 1.93
Table 7: Decreasing returns to scale(Regime 1)
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education Fertility
Without aid
Generation 1 0.13 0.13 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0002 0.1214 Basic 1.76
Generation 3 0.0001 0.0284 Basic 2.21
Feeding programs
Generation 1 0.13 0.13 Basic 1
Generation 2 0.00019 0.1213 Basic 1.77
Generation 3 0.00001 0.0282 Basic 2.29
Food provided in households
Generation 1 0.13 0.13 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0088 0.1214 Basic 1.76
Generation 3 0.0030 0.07 Basic 1.85
39Table 8: Sensitivity analysis
Generations
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education
Without aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27
 =0.003
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0365 0.1829 1
Generation 3 0.0538 0.2503 1
 =0.1
Without aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27
 =0.2
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.091 0.1829 0.8836
Generation 3 0.0066 0.1554 0.62
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis of returns to human capital
Generations
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education
Returns to nutrition:0.2
Without aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27
Returns to nutrition:0.07
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0023 0.1843 0.69
Generation 3 0.0023 0.13 0.49
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